Libya’s fractured political establishment has taken another step towards ending the country’s prolonged transitional crisis after representatives of rival factions signed an agreement committing them to holding presidential and parliamentary elections within two years.
The deal, reportedly signed on Sunday at the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) headquarters in Tripoli, seeks to revive a political process that has repeatedly stalled since Libya’s last planned national vote collapsed in December 2021.
That election was expected to mark a major turning point after years of conflict. Instead, disagreements over the eligibility of leading presidential candidates exposed deeper disputes over electoral rules, the constitutional framework and the legitimacy of Libya’s competing institutions. The vote was postponed indefinitely, leaving the country divided between rival centers of power.
The latest agreement attempts to tackle some of those problems by bringing representatives of the country’s principal political and military institutions into the same framework.
The discussions were conducted through a smaller negotiating format known as the 4+4, involving two representatives each from the Government of National Unity, the High Council of State, the House of Representatives and the Libyan National Army.
Walid Ellafi, Libya’s state minister of political affairs and communications, said presidential and legislative elections should take place within a period “not exceeding 24 months”. He also stressed that the elections should be conducted under a single executive authority and with unified national institutions.
That point is particularly significant because Libya’s political crisis is not simply an electoral dispute. The country remains divided between institutions and power networks that have developed in the aftermath of the 2011 uprising that toppled longtime ruler Muammar Gaddafi.
The subsequent collapse of central authority produced years of armed confrontation. In 2014, Libya effectively split between rival eastern and western administrations, backed by competing armed groups and political alliances.
Although a 2020 ceasefire substantially reduced large-scale fighting, it did not resolve the political competition that had fueled the conflict.
The agreement therefore faces a difficult test: translating a political commitment into an election process that all major factions believe they can accept.
Shibani AbuHamoud, who heads the delegation representing the army’s general command, said the 4+4 group would work with UNSMIL to establish an implementation framework within one month.
The agreement also contains a mechanism intended to prevent institutional deadlock. If the House of Representatives and High Council of State fail to approve the deal within a month, the signatories intend to pursue its adoption nationally as a constitutional document through broader mechanisms and seek international support through the U.N. Security Council.
That provision reflects one of the central lessons from Libya’s failed political transitions: agreements can be reached at the negotiating table, but implementation becomes far more difficult when powerful institutions have competing interests.
The proposed 24-month timetable could nevertheless provide Libya with a clearer political horizon. For ordinary Libyans, repeated transitional arrangements have created frustration, while political elites have remained entrenched despite the absence of a nationally elected government with a fresh mandate.
The biggest question is whether the factions that have benefited from the current political arrangement will accept an electoral process whose outcome could remove them from positions of influence.
Libyans have repeatedly heard promises of elections, making the latest announcement less important as a declaration than as a test of political will.
The agreement gives the United Nations an opportunity to rebuild momentum around a stalled settlement. But international backing alone cannot guarantee success. Libya’s rival institutions and armed power centers will ultimately determine whether the proposed roadmap becomes a genuine transition or another agreement that fails before voters ever reach the ballot box.
The coming month may therefore be more important than the two-year deadline itself. If the 4+4 mechanism can produce a credible implementation framework and overcome resistance from the country’s divided institutions, Libya may finally have a route towards nationwide elections.
If it cannot, Sunday’s agreement could become another entry in Libya’s long catalogue of political promises that never translated into a functioning national government.